Part of the reason I am not a very successful blogger is that I can’t always seem to respond to debates quickly enough to actually, you know, influence them. This is one of those cases. Two posts from THURSDAY December 3 started a mini round of blogging… and now on MONDAY December 7 after several other voices joined in, the debate seems to have ended. Anyways… The orginal posts are here from Nathan Hodge and Laura Rozen. Hodge over at Danger Room first:
How the Afghan Surge Was Sold | Danger Room | Wired.com
McChrystal’s “strategic assessment group” included Fred Kagan of the American Enterprise Institute and his wife, Kimberly Kagan of the Institute for the Study of War; Stephen Biddle of the Council on Foreign Relations; Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies; Andrew “Abu Muqawama” Exum of the Center for a New American Security; and Jeremy Shapiro of the Brookings Institution.
It wasn’t a particularly unusual move: The military — like corporate America — likes to bring in consultants for an outside view. Take the Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq, the document that lays out the U.S. military’s near-term and long-term goals. That document gets a fresh look every year, and the most recent review included input from think-tankers.
But as our friend Laura Rozen observed, it was also a way to win the hearts and minds of an important constituency: The foreign-policy pundits and op-ed writers who would help sell the new strategy to the public.
Rozen had actually first broached this argument back in July:
Winning hearts and minds: all of McChrystal’s advisors | The Cable
Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the ascetic new commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, has not gone soft during time spent in Washington.
….
He has moved to deftly enlist the Washington class of think tankers, armchair warriors, foreign-policy pundits and op-ed writers in the success of his mission — as well as grab up a few people who have made their mark in Afghanistan.
She followed this up by noting the following and asking a pointed question:
How the surge was sold – Laura Rozen – POLITICO.com
McChrystal invited numerous think tank hands and frequent media analysts to serve as members of his strategic assessment team. Many — though not all — of them seemed to align themselves with his case for the Afghan surge, and argue for his strategy in numerous media appearances, panel discussions, policy papers, Hill testimony, administration consultations, task forces, etc. Granted, there’s an undeniable self selection process at work in becoming part of the general’s advisory team. But in the end, did they advise him, or did he coopt them — and us?
The Yglesias jumped in adding:
Matthew Yglesias » The Think Tank Arm of the Military-Industrial Complex
A related point that both reflects and re-enforces the military’s extraordinary prestige and political influence is that having a good relationship with the senior military leadership is a very useful career asset for a defense policy analyst.
This provoked responses from the usual suspects. Exum wrote:
Abu Muqawama Sells Out! (UPDATED) | Center for a New American Security
Oh, for goodness sake. Nathan Hodge starts by asking some fair questions about where defense and foreign policy think tanks get their money. (And has a kind word or two for this blogger. Back at you, Danger Room!) But Matthew Yglesias takes things a step too far. If he thinks this blogger — or anyone else advocating the U.S. military take population-centric counterinsurgency more seriously — is in the pocket of the military-industrial complex, he does not understand the acquisitions implications of an institutional move toward COIN, a form of warfare in which expensive weapons platforms like the F-22 have little utility.
And, Ackerman also jumps in with:
ATTACKERMAN » When Think Tankers Stop Being Polite And Start Getting Real
The mundane truth is that while there most certainly is an unhealthy confluence of interests that lead business and the military — and, we should add, the media — into a distorted view of American power, so too is there important internal diversity and counterpressures within that coalition. Not only, as Nathan notes, did Ex arrive at his perspectives long before CNAS put him on the payroll, so too does he take positions that don’t benefit that complex.
Ok… so… Rozen and Hodge point out a problem with think tankers being co-opted, Yglesias sort of misspeaks a little, but still focuses on the key issue of career promotion. Exum and Ackerman then completely miss the boat and try to turn this into a pay-for-play argument. It isn’t. This issue is linked to the Pentagon paid pundits from the Bush Administration.
Message Machine – Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon’s Hidden Hand – Series – NYTimes.com
Hidden behind that appearance of objectivity, though, is a Pentagon information apparatus that has used those analysts in a campaign to generate favorable news coverage of the administration’s wartime performance, an examination by The New York Times has found.
The effort, which began with the buildup to the Iraq war and continues to this day, has sought to exploit ideological and military allegiances, and also a powerful financial dynamic: Most of the analysts have ties to military contractors vested in the very war policies they are asked to assess on air.
The challenge is that while people on the left are perfectly happy to throw stones at this group of pundits most of whom are right-leaning, they’ve been much more reluctant to do the same with the group co-opted by Petraeus and McChrystal. People like Mike O’Hanlon, Ken Pollack, Andrew Exum, and Steve Biddle are smart, talented, and perceived as left-leaning. They aren’t the old generation of conservative general officers and colonels with two decades of defense industry ties. If anything, they are considered part of the core of what gives liberals at least some defense policy street cred. So, questioning them is more difficult for liberal bloggers. Which perhaps partly explains Yglesias’ hasty backtrack.
That said, we have to understand what is going on. It isn’t so much that these guys are bought and paid for. It is that their careers and influence have increased disproportionately due to their confluence of views with current military needs. Consider Exum… he spent a few years in the service, retiring as a captain. He wrote a battle memoir and ran a blog. He’s smart and a hard-charger. But look, he’s barely 30. Why is he so prominent and influential? It is because he can (and does) repeatedly market himself as one of McChrystal’s advisors. It isn’t that he is bought; rather it is that McChrystal has essentially selected a like-minded young man and promoted him by virtue of access above many of his peers. Which is fine in a sense, but problematic from another. The problematic part is that most people see Exum being brought in to advise McChrystal and what they ASSUME is that he earned his privileged position by virtue of being either smarter or harder-working or something meritocratic. Whereas, at best, this is an example of cronyism, at worst an example of a deliberate attempt by a military leader to manufacture a “credentialed” supporter.
Same with many of the others. When Pollack wrote his glowing praise of the surge back in 2007 (critiqued here: Political Reconciliation, Not Military Progress, Key in Iraq | American Security Project), he was best known perhaps as the man who had gotten the Iraq situation most wrong in 2002. But there he was, in Baghdad, given a world-class windshield tour, and suddenly by virtue of his access was rehabilitated. He’d been to Baghdad, see? And been briefed by Petraeus personally!
Look at all the press coverage recently. Compare the coverage given to Cordesman vs. MacGregor. Or Biddle vs. Ward. Or O’Hanlon vs. Preble. Or Nagl vs. Gentile. Or Exum and any of hundreds of retired company grade officers with graduate degrees. Or Kim Kagan vs. Finel. You want to argue that the first person in each comparison — all surge supporters — is a better analyst, scholar, etc than the second who is a surge skeptic? Because, frankly, I don’t see it. What differentiates them is that the first on the list represent people picked out by Petraeus and McChrystal for special access, and that special access has given them special influence in the media and public.
It isn’t pay for play… but what we are seeing is a deliberate effort by military leaders to promote some “opinion makers” over others — in the case of Exum actually creating an opinion maker almost from scratch. And I know Ackerman will jump down my throat and say this is as it has always been, and that I am just being naive in getting worked up over it, but regardless of whether it is old or new, it is still rotten.
UPDATE (12/12/09): After further consideration and some additional private email conversations, I realize that (a) there are a number of factual inaccuracies in this post, and (b) that the claims I am making deserve/require significant empirical support rather than my impressionistic judgments. There is an issue here, but it deserves a most sophisticated treatment than I provided here.
I can’t speak to the first three comparisons in your penultimate paragraph, but as for last two comparisons (Nagl/Gentile and Kagan/You) – Nagl and Kagan were on the surge/COIN bandwagon before it was implemented, so they were kind of “proven right” in the eyes of the media and media/policy junkies.
I’m no fan of anyone at CNAS and generally agree with Gentile on the current debates. But, I think Exum got to where he’s at by being a decent student, learning Arabic, having some military experience in OEF/OIF (even if not very noteworthy), and having an influential/widely read blog on the narrow topic of COIN. I don’t think being an author/blogger means squat in terms of merit, either. But, if 50 applicants are equal, the guy with the book and influential blog will kind of stick out. Besides, didn’t you cite and link to Yglesias in this post? Let’s see, he wrote a book and he’s a popular blogger. And…?
Being “proven right” is pretty meaningless. No one gets the benefit of having been right, and no one pays the cost of being wrong. The punditocracy does not work that way, unfortunately. You get attention by virtue of credentials and access. Now, often access is a function of a particular skill-set — great social skills, intellectual quickness, etc. But often it is a function of (a) membership in the right institutions (including schools), (b) having the right mentors, (c) and being willing to bend to prevailing opinion.
As for Exum… I knew I’d be misinterpreted. But look, I’ve been teaching at Georgetown and at the National War College for over 15 years. I’ve had literally dozens upon dozens of students with his general credentials — combat experience, graduate education, some publications. Yeah, he also has a good blog. So do you Schmedlap… so the guys at Ink Spots… etc. And while, I don’t know who you are in real life Schmedlap, I’m guessing Exum gets more face time on CNN than you do. Is that purely on merit? Maybe, but maybe not, eh?
I admit that I watch about 5 minutes of television per month, so I cannot really gauge who gets how much face time on what cable network.
Regarding the Exum example…
“Why is he so prominent and influential? It is because he can (and does) repeatedly market himself as one of McChrystal’s advisors.”
I agree.
However…
“… McChrystal has essentially selected a like-minded young man and promoted him by virtue of access above many of his peers.”
I don’t know whether you’re suggesting intent. I certainly don’t see any intent on McChrystal’s part. I see this as analogous to dating the popular girl in high school. She’s not trying to make you a hot shot, but you just kind of leverage the relationship to boost your standing. I don’t think McChrystal was pushing an endorsement-for-fame quid pro quo, nor do I think he was trying to help out people who agreed with him (again, not sure if you are suggesting either of those). I think he was searching for people who agreed with him in hopes of validating his own view. When a bunch of think tank dweebs endorse a plan, that carries some weight in the beltway. It just so happens, incidentally, that those dweebs were able to leverage their association with McChrystal and score some appearances on CNN and other channels. Does that sound plausible, or am I being naive?
If that is plausible, then I have one other question: so what? I’m guessing that you and your fellow professors all know that appearing on CNN doesn’t mean squat about one’s intellect, judgment, or expertise. Though, being part of the intelligentsia, you probably word it differently (“an appearance on CNN does not an expert make” – something like that?). So, what’s the big deal? It sounds like the think tank dorks are now cashing in on a bit of celebrity. I guess that’s kind of galling, but is it really a big deal? I get a bit irked when I see someone with about 10% of my combat experience presenting themselves on TV, radio, or in print as some kind of Hackworth reincarnate giving their dicked up views on ROE or, even better, their absolutely worthless views on national security. But, I get over it because I know that entertainment and news have merged. Now, if they started writing articles for Parameters or something similar and were taken seriously, then I might get upset. If they were just suddenly appointed Secretary of the Army, that would trouble me. But being one of the sea of faces in the infotainment realm? So what?
I think it was a deliberate strategy to cultivate “opinion makers.” It was prototyped during the Iraq surge, and implemented by McChrystal in Afghanistan as a deliberate info op against American public opinion. I don’t think it was a quid pro quo in any explicit sense, and I am not suggesting that anyone is particularly bending their views to take advantage of the situation. But just as the pro-business Congressman gets a lot of money from corporate interests, the pro-surge analysts get a lot of access (and resultant career boost) from it. It is precisely as corrupt a relationship as campaign contributions.
In terms of “what’s the big deal”? The think tankers go in and out of government. They are not just infotainment. They serve on prominent advisory panels, testify before Congressional committees, and yes, in many cases will end up with significant responsibilities.
In his Dec. 3rd Abu Muqawama blog post “Abu Muqawama Sells Out!” Andrew Exum wrote:
“I think this is another case of “they disagree with me on policy, therefore they must be intellectually dishonest. Or, hey, maybe we instead have a different set of assumptions, educations and experiences which lead us toward different conclusions.”
However, it would be nice if Mr. Exum actually extended the courtesy of assuming others have honestly reached different conclusions than himself. Before his short “retirement” from blogging, Exum has been quick to hurl ad hominum attacks at other writers instead of addressing the merits of arguments with which he disagrees. A couple of recent examples:
“He Who Shall Not Be Fact-Checked” (Nov. 9th):
“My theory is that [Seymour] Hersh’s journalism is a little like a 12-gauge shotgun. He just lets it go, and something is bound to hit the target. … such is his reputation that people only remember the articles of his that actually exposed something new and none of the articles that, in retrospect, turned out to be just crazy talk.”
“On Martial Virtue … and Selling Jon Krakauer’s Crappy New Book” (Nov. 2nd):
“A few months ago, I was asked to review Jon Krakauer’s new book by the Washington Post… Alas, the book was awful. I mean, it was really bad. … So Krakauer wrote a crappy book, and now he has to market it. And how is he doing that? By going after Stan McChrystal, who is probably the least culpable guy in Tillman’s chain of command for any of the stupid things that happened in the aftermath of his death. … in the eyes of Krakauer and on the fringes of the American left, soldiers are either victims of circumstance or war criminals in waiting.… Stan McChrystal is one of the finest men I have ever known, and I hope I have sons who serve under men like him.”
I believe Mr. Exum is either woefully ignorant of the most basic facts of the Tillman story or is awfully good at feigning self-righteous anger. Previously, I’ve addressed McChrystal’s central role (as well as that of Senator Webb, NYT reporter Thom Shanker, etc.) in the handling of the aftermath of Pat Tillman’s friendly-fire death.
(Note: see my documents posted at feralfirefighter.blogspot.com for more info. The Andrew Exum doc is still in progress. Others have been posted with information on Pat Tillman & Yoni Netanyahu (yes, Benjamin’s brother), Senator Webb and the Democratic Congress’s role in covering for McChrystal, and the NYT’s Pentagon Reporter Thom Shanker’s role in “clearing McChrystal of all wrongdoing” in the handling of Tillmans friendly-fire death).
In his September 13th Washington Post book review, Mr. Exum neglected to mention General McChrystal’s culpability in the Tillman case or disclose his close personal and professional ties with him (e.g. this past summer, Exum spent a month working closely with McChrystal in Afghanistan after being asked by McChrystal to join his Afghan war assessment team). Andrew Exum is a fellow at CNAS, “Washington’s go-to think tank on military affairs.” CNAS has spearheaded the advocacy of General McChrystal’s Afghan war “surge” and has close ties with McChrystal (meets with him weekly by videoconference) and his mentor General Petraeus.
Quite possibly, Mr. Exum believes his own BS about the purity of General McChrystal. As the saying goes, “It is difficult to get a man to understand something, when his salary depends upon his not understanding it.”
Guy Montag, SSGT Co. “F” (Ranger) 425th Infantry, MI ARNG 1983 — 1991
I really don’t want to single out Exum. He is genuinely bright, and one of the he’s also less arrogant and less thin-skinned than many others. Having him in the debate is a net plus, without question. True, he is overly enamored with Petraeus and McChrystal. And they are the bigger problem. We literally have not have any generals push the envelop of appropriate civil-military relations since MacArthur. They have waged a systematic info ops campaign against the American public. The think tank “outreach” is part of that process.
“But just as the pro-business Congressman gets a lot of money from corporate interests, the pro-surge analysts get a lot of access (and resultant career boost) from it. It is precisely as corrupt a relationship as campaign contributions.”
Is there a way for a campaign contribution to not be inherently corrupt? If a candidate shares my views, I cannot contribute to his campaign without it being corrupt? Likewise, is there a way for a think tanker with a particular view to advocate that view without having his integrity questioned?
“They serve on prominent advisory panels, testify before Congressional committees, and yes, in many cases will end up with significant responsibilities.”
Advisory panels and testimony before Congress are generally not about actual advising or fact-finding. Decision makers seek testimony to support existing views, not input to help form a new view. Just as a lawyer only calls witnesses to extract specific information and does not ask questions that he does not know the answers to, decision makers likewise choose their “advisors” and “testifiers.”
I guess some could find themselves in positions of responsibility, but I don’t think anyone assumes that being an analyst/commentator translates into leadership or management skill.
“Is there a way for a campaign contribution to not be inherently corrupt? If a candidate shares my views, I cannot contribute to his campaign without it being corrupt? Likewise, is there a way for a think tanker with a particular view to advocate that view without having his integrity questioned?”
I agree. My point is that we consider our politicians to be corrupt or at least suspect as a consequence, and the same problem exists for think tankers.
And it isn’t so much about integrity — though we ALL pull our punches sometimes for professional reasons. It is about the deliberate creation of a privileged group of pundits. And that isn’t even a problem in itself, except that frankly some of the people so promoted don’t have any self-awareness. They are buying into their own hype, which is making them arrogant and thin-skinned. Seriously, questioning some of these guys provokes outlandish reactions — just dirty, nasty stuff that I can’t/won’t get into here. It is as if even writing a critique is considered a crime of lèse majesté.
[...] is even more explicit in suggesting a quid-pro-quo. I speculated about this back in 2009, in a post that I later mostly withdrew, but which in general I think is still accurate, though I lacked then [...]