I have discussed my concerns that our strategy in Afghanistan involves either deliberately or, more likely, inadvertently setting up the Afghans to fail (The Incoherence of COIN Advocates: Andrew Exum Edition). In that post, I wrote:

Furthermore, the desire to curtail corruption runs counter to the desire to secure the cooperation of provincial leaders.  We are setting the Afghans up to fail.

In today’s NYT, there is further discussion of this issue:

Karzai Wins Afghan Warlords’ Support as Others Fear the Cost – NYTimes.com

Today Mr. Karzai’s warlord backers include Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek commander whose men are accused of killing hundreds of Taliban prisoners of war in 2001 and who is now vying to regain wider control of northern Afghanistan; Hajji Muhammad Moheqiq and Karim Khalili, warlords from the Hazara Shiite minority ethnic group; and Abdul Rab Rassoul Sayyaf, whose militia killed hundreds of Hazara civilians in western Kabul in 1993.

Another warlord supporter, Gul Agha Sherzai, who has been implicated in drug-related corruption and is now governor of Nangarhar Province, could “possibly” become governor of Kandahar, “or maybe a minister,” said Mr. Karzai’s campaign manager, Hajji Din Muhammad.

“I’m sure that whoever the mujahedeen support will win the election,” Mr. Muhammad said, referring to the warlords.

Western officials are watching closely. “I expect an understanding of the fact that we need fewer warlords and more competent ministers,” said Kai Eide, leader of the United Nations mission in Afghanistan. He said that Western governments were encouraged by reform-minded appointees to several ministries, including interior and finance, and that it had been made clear to Mr. Karzai that the trend must continue.

The challenge is this.  Afghanistan has a pretty well established pattern of governance.  Securing the loyalty of local elites provides stability.  But instead of trying to take advantage of this, we’re seeking to overturn it in order to try to implement an operational doctrine that requires establishing a monopoly of force by the central government along with efforts to build popular loyalty through good governance.

I don’t doubt that Afghanistan would be a better place if we were successful, but this all explains why the Taliban was able to control Afghanistan prior to 2001 with perhaps 30,000 poorly trained troops and certainly under $1 billion in government revenue, while we’re struggling to do so despite nearly 100,000 superbly trained and equipped western forces bolstered by over 100,000 Afghan National Army troops all at a cost of over $60 billion (which, btw, is several multiples of Afghanistan’s GDP).