I’ve been doing some thinking in preparation for my debate tomorrow night with Mark Jacobson hosted by the Pell Center at Salve Regina University. We’ll be talking Afghanistan policy, mostly looking forward, but it is hard to discuss where we are going without considering where we’ve been.
Anyway, it has become a truism that the Bush Administration blundered badly in Iraq when it assumed (wished?) we’d be greeted as liberators in 2003. Instead of a grateful, helpful, eager population, we found the Iraqis, instead, to be resentful, focused on avenging past grievances, and generally non-cooperative. I think most people now see this as unsurprising, and our failure to plan accordingly a cause of much avoidable heartache.
In 2009, we dramatically expanded our presence in Afghanistan on the assumption that we could, in short order, establish security in the country, promote self-sustaining development, establish competent security forces, and stabilize and legitimize existing political institutions. As it turns out, none of this has worked out quite as planned. There was more violence in 2009 than in 2008, more in 2010 than 2009, more in 2011 than in 2010. The first quarter of 2012 was better than the first quarter of 2011, but only back to the 2010 level, and still higher even peak levels in 2008-9. So maybe we’re finally seeing a downturn, but I think that is a premature conclusion. There are increasing doubts about the effectiveness of development initiatives. And well, as Joshua Foust ably demonstrates, evidence on security forces and legitimacy is decidedly mixed or lacking.
I would argue that these outcomes in Afghanistan are unsurprising.
So I guess my question is, which set of assumptions was more (un)likely a priori? The assumption of being greeted as liberators? Or the assumption that we could somehow transform a poor, war-torn country into a nation able to essentially fend for itself against a well-established insurgency?
I don’t have a firm answer, but I have to say that simply by virtue of their scope, the 2009 assumptions were even more unlikely than the 2003 ones. In 2003, the Bush admin was essentially hoping that the Iraqi state could be decapitated, but that it would otherwise continue to function according to the status quo. The Obama admin, instead, was banking on being able to induce a pretty major transformation of Afghan society under fire.
Now, I am not saying the Obama decision was worse. Bush had the option of doing nothing, i.e. not invading Iraq. Obama was faced with a war in progress, so I think it is fair to cut him a little slack there. But purely on the basis of key assumptions, the 2009 surge was easily as badly reasoned as was the invasion of Iraq.
The strategic assumptions under girding the war in Afghanistan — that pop-centric COIN and development assistance could bring stability and security — are to my mind less reasonable than the assumption that the US would be greeted as liberators in Iraq. The Afghan plan for victory was just so plainly impossible that it makes the long-shot assumption of a friendly Iraqi population seem a bit more reasonable.
Broadening the question a bit to examine which theory of victory was most ridiculous narrows the margin a bit. Even if on balance Iraqis were friendly to the US invaders, it is hard to imagine how an analyst circa 2003 could have assumed that the occupation would not provoke an insurgency.
It also seems unfair to compare the reasoning for initiating a hugely costly war in the middle east under false pretenses with a last ditch effort to turn the tide of a disastrous war. Perhaps I am cutting Obama slack simply because his mistake pales in comparison to those of the Bush Admin.
Well, that was depressing.
I think in Iraq in 2003 and Afghanistan in 2001-2002 we were greeted as liberators, but that it was short lived and is no longer remembered. I think Iraqi’s and Afghans assumed we knew what we were doing and assumed we were there to help them and their factional/sectarian “side.” They quickly realized, however, that we were in way over our heads, especially in Iraq. Not only were we incompetent, but we couldn’t hope to reconcile all the competing internal divisions and interests in each nation.
So I think it’s a little of both.