From OTB: More Language and Culture, Fewer Guns

“Therefore, Krepinvech suggests, we should reduce ‘the military’s continuing relatively high emphasis on conventional operations… in order to support language and cultural training, as well as other ’soft’ skills that are particularly useful in irregular warfare.’”

I’m a much less renowned military analyst than Krepinevich and I’ve been saying this since 1992.

But here is the problem.  Is it really in our interest to get involved in counter-insurgency around the world.? There is a HUGE difference between developing the capacity to reach out and whack terrorist groups and planning for long-term occupations and counter-insurgency operations.  As a practical matter, even a victorious counter-insurgency is rarely worth the costs, and historically victories for great powers in these sorts of foreign interventions are few and far between.

I am sympathetic to the arguments of people like Krepinevich and Joyner here, but we are really putting the cart before the horse.  If you can convince the American public that we should not only remain in Iraq, but be prepared to fight more or less continuous conflicts like Iraq in the future, then sure, let’s build up these capabilities.  But I think a moment’s reflection highlights how unlikely that is.

What we forgot since the Vietnam War was not so much how to wage counter-insurgency, but rather the tremendous costs and small benefits that accrue from engaging in these sorts of conflicts at all.