James Joyner writes:

Balancing Secrecy and Democracy

There are legitimate operational secrets to be kept while we’re at war. Additionally, the fact that information shared with the American people is also shared with our enemies and the publics of situational allies makes transparency and full candor difficult. But our leaders owe it to us to present a realistic account of where we are in this thing rather than engaging in feel good propaganda.

The problem — and I don’t know whether Bernard and I are in agreement here — is how to balance these competing interests.

I agree 100% and it is difficult.  And I also agree with James’ other concerns — about junior operatives making decisions on their own assessment of “whistle blowing,” about the likely response of the IC which will be to tighten access, and about the likely response of foreign governments not to trust us.

But that said, this issue is raising two fundamental challenges of COIN/state-building:

(1) These long, drawn-out conflicts breed cynicism and disillusionment.  Just as a decade at war created a kind of arrogant disdain for civilian control in McChrystal’s staff, it also created in some IC and military analysts a corrosive cynicism about authority and rules.  These are the flip sides of the same coin, and both are the result of fighting drawn-out, grinding conflicts.

(2) A fundamental challenge of COIN by third parties is that the outside party is a fundamental source of illegitimacy.  Everything we touch instantly acquires the patina of imperialism. So, in order to be “successful” we need to camouflage our role.  But as a practical matter, we can’t do it. We are the ones training and equipping (and partnering with) Afghan security forces.  We’re the ones financing infrastructure projects.  We’re the ones trying to mediate local disputes.  And every time we do any of those things, we’re putting our partners and collaborators at risk.  But you can’t hope to keep the level of contact and cooperative envisaged by our COIN operational guidance secret.  Most of Afghanistan’s GDP can be traced back to U.S. sources today.  I just don’t see how this level of involvement can ever been effectively hidden.

So, yes, we need to balance operational secrecy with the transparency required for democratic accountability, but we also need to avoid strategic choices that exacerbate these tensions.  Our approach to COIN seems designed to expose every imaginable weaknesses in our capabilities. Given our capabilities and our system of government, we are currently pursuing the worst possible strategic option and most misusing our national strengths.