Comments on: Underestimating the Taliban

By: Afghanistan: Answering Finel’s 10 Questions « The Stupidest Man on Earth

Mon, 07 Sep 2009 22:43:05 +0000

[...] no amount of arms or assistance would stop it from happening. In fact, Finel himself has already made the case: […] In many ways we underestimate the Taliban. This is an extraordinary movement. It rose from [...]

By: Bernard Finel

Bernard Finel — Thu, 03 Sep 2009 00:41:40 +0000

The two parts of my response actually need to be considered together. What I have heard people say is that if we follow 3-24 diligently then any failure that occurs will be simply due to either chance or some exogenous factor such as lack of cooperation from the local government. That, in other words, there is no strategic gap that might be exploitable by enemy action, but rather that there are some factors beyond the control of the counter-insurgent force that might prevent success from occurring. Exum has made this argument numerous times in writing, for one.

But I also think this is the clear implication of 3-24. I mean, look at the chapters 4 and 5 — on designing and executing COIN campaigns and operations, look at the LLOs — where is the adversary there? Everything is targeted at the local population. It is like the enemy does not even exist. He is purely epiphenomenal to the purported legitimacy gap. The nature of the subject population is clearly very important — though largely assumed to be maleable through the provision of material goods. The subject of the enemy receives the most cursory and generic treatment.

I may be misreading or misunderstanding 3-24. And indeed, you could certainly cobble together individual passages on, say, intelligence gathering that are more enemy-focused. But even the broad categorizations of potential enemy behavior has no clear implications for how operations should be designed or executed.

By: Gulliver

Gulliver — Wed, 02 Sep 2009 20:56:17 +0000

I meant it as — if we follow 3-24/Galula with sufficient diligence — “victory” will ensue. I am not sure that is true either, in part because I think there are relatively obvious and straightforward ways in which an adversary could defeat the operational concept laid out in 3-24.

There may be people who are asserting this, but I don’t know who they are. I’ve been ’round and ’round on this with COL Gentile, too: I keep asking him to produce a culprit and he dissembles. Who are the people saying that 3-24 is a certain template for victory? Who are the people suggesting that the specific nature of the subject population and/or the enemy is irrelevant?

So if I were asked “can victory be guaranteed through the effective application of COIN doctrine?”, I would obviously say “no, not in all cases, and perhaps not even in most.” One could even suggest that it’s the best approach available to us while still lacking confidence in its universal applicability or chances of success.

So for me, I’d suggest 1) that the “successful” and consistent application of COIN doctrine in Afghanistan will not necessarily achieve “victory” (such as it were), and 2) that “victory” in Afghanistan will not necessarily make the requisite contribution to American security or interests to justify the costs of our involvement there.

By: Bernard Finel

Bernard Finel — Wed, 02 Sep 2009 20:32:41 +0000

Gulliver: Fair enough. Though I would make two points. First, whether it is Exum or Biddle or Kilcullen, the challenge is usually phrased as exogenous to U.S. actions. They admit that pop-centric COIN is an uncertain project, but consider it subject to essentially random effects rather than the possibility of being systematically subverted by enemy action. Second, I obviously didn’t mean it tautologically. I meant it as — if we follow 3-24/Galula with sufficient diligence — “victory” will ensue. I am not sure that is true either, in part because I think there are relatively obvious and straightforward ways in which an adversary could defeat the operational concept laid out in 3-24. I am being a bit vague on the latter because I am writing a long article on that particular issues, and I am still working on some pieces of it, so I don’t want to write things I will later be forced to retract as my research proceeds.

By: Gulliver

Gulliver — Wed, 02 Sep 2009 18:56:28 +0000

We are assuming that if we do everything right, we’ll “win.”

1. Who is assuming this?

2. This is a tautology. Of course we’ll win if we do everything right, so long as “doing everything right” is defined as “doing what it takes to win.”

“Doing everything right” would obviously include adapting to the enemy’s adaptations.